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NEW VISTAS OF DAMAGES IN MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES
Warren M. Faris*
The first three years of the current decade marked significant
changes in the law of maritime personal injury and death damages.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court rendered American Export
Lines, Inc. v. Alvez,' in which the court held that the wife of a
longshoreman injured in state waters was entitled to recover for the
loss of her husband's society. The next year, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in In re Merry Shipping, Inc.,2 held that punitive damages
were recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action arising in state
waters and based upon the general maritime law. In 1982, the Fifth
Circuit, in Culver v. Slater Boat Co.,' ruled that inflation could be considered in ascertaining damage awards for loss of future earnings.
Loss OF SOCIETY

The Supreme Court, in Alvez, followed its wrongful death decisions in holding that the wife of an injured longshoreman could
recover for loss of society in an action based upon negligence and
unseaworthiness. Thus, a review of the wrongful death decisions will
be undertaken herein before the personal injury decisions are analyzed.
Wrongful Death
Traditionally, nonpecuniary damages were not recoverable in
maritime wrongful death actions. In 1886, the United States Supreme
4 held that the general maritime law did not
Court, in The Harrisburg,
afford a right of action for wrongful death. To alleviate this harsh
rule, Congress, in 1920, passed the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA) and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*
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1. 446 U.S. 274 (1980). See generally Note, Alvez v. American Export Lines: A
Reverse Erie Approach to Maritime Cases, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 321 (1980); Note, Loss
of Consortium in Negligent Injury Under the General Maritime Law: The Unrigging
of Igneri-American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 5 MAR. LAW. 117 (1980); Note,
Admiralty-Loss of Society Claim Allowed .for Wife of a Longshoreman Injured in State
Territorial Waters, 55 TUL. L. REV. 545 (1981). For a further discussion of Alvez, see
infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
2. 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion of Merry Shipping, see
infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
3. 688 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (rehearing applied for). For a further
discussion of Culver, see infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
4. 119 U.S. 199 (1886). This case subsequently was overruled by Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), discussed in text at notes 9-16, infra.
5. 46 U.S.C. SS 761-768 (1976). Section 761 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
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as the Jones Act.' DOHSA provides representatives of seamen killed
on the high seas with a cause of action for their decedent's wrongful
death, where such death resulted from unseaworthiness or negligence.
The damages recoverable under DOHSA were limited by its terms
to pecuniary losses.' The Jones Act provides representatives of seamen
killed in state waters with a cause of action for their decedent's
wrongful death, where such death resulted from the negligence of the
employer. Even though the Jones Act does not expressly exclude
recovery of nonpecuniary losses, it was judicially construed as excluding such damages in wrongful death actions.' In state-water
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
for damages in the disjrict courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the
exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable
if death had not ensued.
See generally 2 A. SANN, S. BELLMAN, B. CHASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 81 (7th
ed. 1982 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY]; G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-29 (2d ed. 1975).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976). The act provides:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of
trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seaman as a result of
any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action
for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in
such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant
employer resides or in which his principal office is located.
See generally 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 5, §§ 27, 81; G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 5, § 6-20.
7. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976) provides:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be
apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally
have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the
suit is brought.
8. In Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913), the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.. 51 (1976), provides
for recovery of pecuniary damages only in death actions, even though the Act does
not expressly limit the damages recoverable. 227 U.S. at 70. Since the Jones Act expressly makes the FELA applicable in actions brought pursuant to the Jones Act,
courts consistently have followed Vreeland in Jones Act death cases. See, e.g., Ivy v.
Security Barge Lines, Inc., 606 F.2d 524, 526 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (the Vreeland
decision has been adopted uniformly in Jones Act cases); In re Risdal & Anderson,
Inc., 291 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D. Mass. 1968) (Vreeland rule applicable in Jones Act case);
In re Southern S.S. Co., 135 F. Supp. 258, 359-60 (D. Del. 1955) (same); American Barge
Line Co. v. Leatherman's Admin., 306 Ky. 284, 206 S.W.2d 955 (1947) (same).
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wrongful death actions based on the general maritime law for
unseaworthiness, state wrongful death acts were held applicable.'
Thus, the recovery of nonpecuniary losses in death actions arising
on state waters depended upon the applicable state wrongful death
statute. Not surprisingly, these statutes varied from state to state;
these state statutes also varied from DOHSA.' ° These and other problems associated with allowing state wrongful death statutes to govern
actions arising in state waters were addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc." In Moragne,
a longshoreman was killed aboard a vessel moored in state waters
off the coast of Florida. His widow brought a wrongful death action
against the vessel owner, claiming unseaworthiness and negligence.
At trial, the federal district court found that the decedent's death
was caused solely by the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Since the
Florida wrongful death statute and the general maritime law did not
provide for a wrongful death action based upon unseaworthiness, both
the trial court and the Fifth Circuit denied the widow's claim.' 2 Resolving to "assure uniform vindication of federal policies,"' 3 the
Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg"and recognized a general
9. Prior to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), "the
established principle of maritime law [was] that in the absence of a statute there
... [was] no action for wrongful death." The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 590
(1959). However, "where death . . . [resulted] from a maritime tort committed on
navigable waters within a State whose statutes ... [gave] a right of action on account
of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts [entertained] . . . a libel in personam
for the damages sustained by those to whom such a right [was] given." Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921). See In re S.S. Helena, 529 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1976); Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Serv. of Texas, Inc., 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969).
10. For example, under Louisiana law, the proper elements of damages in actions
from wrongful death are not only loss of contributions from the decedent but also
loss of society, grief, anguish, loss of love and affection, loss of services, and loss of
support. Silverman v. Travelers Co., 277 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1960); Roundtree v. Technical
Welding & Fabrication Co., 364 So. 2d 1325 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). The Louisiana
Legislature recently amended Civil Code article 2315 to authorize recovery of damages
for loss of consortium. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315, as amended by 1982 La. Acts, No. 202,
S 1.
11. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). See generally Note, Wrongful Death at General Maritime
Law-The Moragne Decision, 31 LA. L. REV. 165 (1970); Note, Admiralty-The General
Maritime Law as Embracing a Right of Action for Wrongful Death, 45 TUL. L. REV.
151 (1970).
12. 398 U.S. at 376-77.
13. Id. at 401.
14. Id. at 409. The court pointed out certain anomalies as their reason for overruling The Harrisburg:
The first of these is simply the discrepancy produced whenever the rulb of The
Harrisburgholds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal
law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim
is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. As we have concluded, such
a distinction is not compatible with the general policies of federal maritime law.
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maritime law cause of action for wrongful death resulting from unseaworthiness. 5 The Court, however, left open the question as to the
types of damages recoverable in this new action, leaving this issue
to be resolved by the lower courts." After conflicting decisions by
the lower courts, the Supreme Court, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet," decided to resolve the damages issue. In Gaudet, a
longshoreman injured in state waters sued a vessel owner for
unseaworthiness and a judgment was rendered in the longshoreman's
favor and satisfied by the defendant. Subsequently, the longshoreman
died and his wife brought a Moragne-type action against the defendant. The district court dismissed the wife's suit on the grounds of
res judicata and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Reversing the trial court, the Fifth Circuit held that Moragne
provided the wife with a separate cause of action that was not extinguished by the husband's recovery of damages for his personal injuries. After affirming the Fifth Circuit's holding that the wife was
entitled to a Moragne-type action, the Supreme Court, following a majority of the states, rather than DOHSA or the Jones Act, 8 held that
loss of society, as well as loss of support, funeral expenses, and loss
of services, was recoverable in a Moragne action. 9 The Court reasoned
that recovery for nonpecuniary elements, such as loss of society,
was "compelled if [the Court was] to shape the remedy to comport
with the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 'special
The second incongruity is that identical breaches of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the three-mile limitsince a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n. 4 (1958)but not within the territorial waters of a State whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims. The United States argues that since the substantive duty is
federal, and federal maritime jurisdiction covers navigable waters within and
without the three-mile limit, no rational policy supports this distinction in the
availability of a remedy.
The third, and assertedly the "strangest" anomaly is that a true seaman-that
is, a member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no remedy
for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a
longshoreman, to whom the duty of seaworthiness was extended oily because
he performs work traditionally done by seamen, does have such a remedy when
allowed by a state statute.
Id. at 395-96.
15. Id. at 409.
16. Id. at 408.
17. 414 U.S. 573 (1974). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 5, SS
6-32 to 6-33; Comment, Charting the Waters After Moragne: Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 566 (1974); Comment, Admiralty Law-General Maritime
Wrongful Death Action-PersonalInjtry Recovery Does Not Bar Wrongful Death ActionSea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 20 N.Y.L.F. 831 (1975).
18. 414 U.S. at 586-88 & n.21.
19. Id. at 584.
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solicitude' for those who [were] injured within its jurisdiction."' The
Court also explained that its decision comported with "recent trends"
in the maritime law." The Supreme Court, in Gaudet, distinguished
loss of society from other nonpecuniary damages by its definition:
Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or
grief, which is not compensable under the maritime wrongful-death
remedy. The former entails the loss of positive benefits, while the
latter represents an emotional response to the wrongful death.
The difference between the two is well expressed as follows:
"When we speak of recovery for the beneficiaries' mental
anguish, we are primarily concerned, not with the benefits they
have lost, but with the issue of compensating them for their harrowing experience resulting from the death of a loved one."22
The Court further explained that when the tort victim sues during
his lifetime, as in Gaudet, he also represents his dependent's interest.
In such a case, if a wrongful death action is brought subsequent to
the tort victim's death, collateral estoppel precludes the representatives from recovering damages which the decedent could have received in his action. The representatives' damages, therefore, are
limited to their own losses, such as loss of society, loss of services,
and funeral expenses." The Gaudet decision was written broadly, and
the Court did not expressly limit its rationale to the particular facts
of the case, that is, a wrongful death action arising in state waters.
Thus, confusion arose as to whether Gaudet-type damages were limited
to actions arising within state waters or whether such damages supplemented DOHSA in actions arising on the high seas."4
To resolve these questions, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
25
in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
a wrongful death case arising
on the high seas. In Higginbotham, the Court held that when death
occurs on the high seas, the damages recoverable are limited to those
prescribed in DOHSA. Recognizing that its decision created a conflict between actions arising in state waters and actions arising on
20.
21.

Id. at 588.
Id. at 587.

22.

Id. at 585 n.17 (quoting S.

SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

S 3.45

at 222-23 (1966)).
23. 414 U.S. at 591-95.
24. Compare Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 802 (1st Cir. 1974) (Moragne and
Gaudet limited to inland waters) with Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 510 F.2d 242, 250
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975) (Moragne and Gaudet
not limited to inland waters). See generally Note, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Actions: A Moragne for All Waters, 22 Loy. L. REV. 646 (1976).
25. 436 U.S. 618 (1978). See generally Maraist, Maritime Wrongful DeathHigginbotham Reverses Trend and Creates New Questions, 39 LA. L. REV. 81 (1978).
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the high seas, the Court concluded that the need for uniformity could
not override the express provisions of DOHSA."6
Higginbotham settled the question as to whether Gaudet-type
damages are recoverable for wrongful death actions arising upon the
high seas, but the decision raised questions regarding the types of
damages recoverable in wrongful death actions arising in state waters.
The first such question is whether nonpecuniary damages are
recoverable in a wrongful death action based solely upon the Jones
Act, and the second such question is whether nonpecuniary damages
are recoverable in a wrongfuldeath action based upon the Jones Act
and unseaworthiness. The question of whether nonpecuniary damages
are recoverable in a wrongful death action arising on state waters
and based solely upon the Jones Act was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc.27 In Ivy, the decedent's father's
claim for loss of society was based solely on the Jones Act, since the
jury found the defendant negligent but found the vessel on which the
decedent worked seaworthy. Refusing to depart from prior
jurisprudence denying the recovery of nonpecuniary damages in Jones
Act wrongful death cases, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in a death claim based
solely upon the Jones Act.28 The question of whether nonpecuniary
damages are recoverable in a wrongful death claim based upon the
Jones Act and unseaworthiness was addressed by the Fifth Circuit
in Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc.29 and Smith v. Ithaca Corp.,3" soon
after the en banc Ivy decision. At the outset of both of these decisions, the court noted that the issue already had been decided by the
Fifth Circuit in a pre-Higginbotham case, Landry v. Two R. Drilling
Co." In Landry, the court held that "where... there is liability under
both a Jones Act claim and a general maritime claim for unseaworthiness . . .Gaudet damages . . .[are] proper."32 Concluding that the
Landry rationale had not been affected by Higginbotham or Ivy, the
court in both Hlodan and Smith held that Gaudet-type damages are
recoverable in actions based upon the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
26.
27.

436 U.S. at 624.
606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). See generally Sipple, Admiralty, 31

MERCER L. REV. 825, 826 (1980).

28. 606 F.2d at 529.
29. 611 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980).
30. 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980). These cases were decided almost simultaneously
by two different panels of the Fifth Circuit. In a footnote at the end of the Smith
opinion, the court noted that its decision was in accord with Hlodan. 612 F.2d at 266*.
31. 511 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 143.
33. Smith, 612 F.2d at 226; Hlodan, 611 F.2d at 74-75. See generally Note,
Admiralty-Loss of Society Recovery Allowed in Addition to Jones Act Pecuniary Recovery
for Wrongful Death. 55 TUL, L. REV. 1284 (1981).
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Interestingly, in Smith the decedent's death resulted from injuries
occurring in state waters as well as on the high seas. The Smith court
concluded that the burden was on the defendant to segregate the
losses occurring on the high seas from the losses occurring in state
waters. Since the defendant was unable to carry this burden, the plaintiff recovered Gaudet-type damages for all of his injuries.'
Personal Injury
Prior to 1920, seamen were afforded a right of action for injuries
caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel, but they were not afforded
a right of action for injuries arising from the negligence of the master
or crew of the vessel." In 1920, Congress enacted the Jones Act,37
which provided seamen with a right of action for injuries resulting
from the negligence of the owner, master, or crew of a vessel.
The Jones Act, although silent on the matter, was construed
judicially as excluding recovery for loss of consortium,," but the courts
divided on whether such damages were compensable under the general
maritime law. The Second Circuit, in dicta, in Savage v. New York,
N. & H. S.S. Co., 9 suggested against recovery for loss of consortium,
and the Third Circuit, in New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co.
v. Johnson, ° allowed recovery for loss of consortium in personal injury actions. In 1962, the Second Circuit, in Igneri v. Companie de
Transports Oceaniques,' a personal injury case, concluded that loss
of consortium was not compensable under the general maritime law
because the maritime law on the subject was unsettled and the weight
of state authority was against it.
As recently as 1976, the Fifth Circuit, in Christofferson v. Halliburton Co.," a personal injury case based on the general maritime law
34.
35.

612 F.2d at 226.
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). See generally 1B A. SANN, S. BELLMAN,
N. GOLDEN, B. CHASE, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY S 2 (7th ed. 1982 & Supp. 1982); G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 5, S 6-20 (1975).
36. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
37. Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. S 688 (1976)).
38. See note 6, supra.
39. 185 F. 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1911).
40. 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912).
41. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964). See generally Note,

Torts-Admiralty-Right of Wife of Longshoreman to Recover for Loss of Consortium,
30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 379 (1964).
42. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976). Christofferson was later overruled in Cruz v.
Hendy Int'l Co., 638 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981). See text at note 50, infra. See generally

Note, Admiralty-Loss of Consortium-The Wife of An Injured Seaman Has No Cause
of Action in Admiralty for Loss of Consortium Caused by A Negligently Inflicted Nonfatal Injury to Her Husband, 11 GA. L. REV. 210 (1976).
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for unseaworthiness, followed Igneri and ruled that a wife could not
recover for loss of consortium. The court rejected the argument that
Gaudet governed the case, reasoning that since Gaudet was a wrongful
death case, it had no effect in the personal injury context. The court
also rejected the argument that Igneri was no longer viable since
thirty-seven states, as opposed to eleven states when Igneri was
decided, allowed recovery for loss of consortium. Quoting from a
passage in Igneri providing that an admiralty court would follow a
uniform or near uniform common law rule in the absence of a maritime
rule, the court reasoned that Igneri was still good law since the law
from thirty-seven states did not constitute a uniform or near uniform
common law rule. As illustrated by Christofferson, a debate arose over
whether Igneri or Gaudet was controlling in personal injury actions
based on the general maritime law. Resolving to settle this issue, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in American Export Lines, Inc. v.
Alvez. 4" Alvez, a longshoreman, was injured while working on board
a vessel moored in state waters. Subsequently, he filed suit alleging
negligence and unseaworthiness, and he later amended his complaint,
adding his wife's claim for loss of society."
After reviewing Igneri," the Supreme Court concluded that it was
sound when it was decided but subsequent events had altered its
rationale. The Court found that after Igneri was decided in 1962,
Gaudet had recognized a general maritime law cause of action for loss
of a spouse's society in a wrongful death action arising in state waters.
Finding no rational reason to distinguish between wrongful death and
personal injury actions," the Court concluded that "Gaudet provides
the conclusive decisional recognition of a right to recover for loss of
society" in personal injury actions based on the general maritime law
and arising in state waters.47 The Court then noted that forty-one
states and the District of Columbia allowed recovery for loss of
society,48 as opposed to only eleven states when Igneri was decided.
43. 446 U.S. 274 (1980). See generally Note, Admiralty-Loss of Society Claim Allowed
for Wife of a Longshoreman Injured in State Territoral Waters, 55 TUL. L. REV. 545
(1981).
44. 446 U.S. at 276. Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court first had
to decide "whether this case fell within the Court's statutory jurisdiction to review
'[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had' [under 28 U.S.C. S 1257]." 446 U.S. at 277. The Court concluded
that it did have jurisdiction. 446 U.S. at 277-79. Justices Marshall, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented from this decision as to jurisdiction and did not express an opinion
upon the merits. Id. at 286-90.
45. For a discussion of Igneri, see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
46. In a footnote, the Court observed that the Fifth Circuit, in Christofferson,
erroneously had limited Gaudet to the wrongful death context. 446 U.S. at 281 n.8.
47. Id. at 280-81.
48. Id. at 284 & n.11.
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Such an overwhelming majority, according to the Court, translated
'
"into maritime law by the Igneri analysis."49
The court concluded that
its decision comported with the notion that seamen and their
dependents were entitled to special solicitude. Although Alvez is the
latest word from the Supreme Court on a spouse's right to recover
damages for loss of society in maritime personal injury actions, the
Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue in a slightly different setting
from that in Alvez. In Cruz v. Hendy InternationalCo.,5" the wife of
a seaman injured in state waters brought suit for loss of society under
the Jones Act and general maritime law after a judgment had been
rendered in her husband's favor and satisfied by the defendant. The
trial court dismissed the suit, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld
the dismissal on the authority of Christofferson.1 While the petition
for rehearing en banc was pending, Alvez was rendered. Cruz was
then remanded to the original panel to be reconsidered in light of
Alvez.
After reviewing the wrongful death decisions and Alvez, the court
concluded that Alvez was not limited to its facts. Noting the Supreme
Court's statement in Alvez that there was no distinction between personal injury and death actions, the shipowner argued that Jones Act
precedent and DOHSA, by its terms, precluded recovery for loss of
society claims based on the general maritime law. However, the
Supreme Court also had observed in Alvez that DOHSA and the Jones
Act did not provide analogous support on this issue because both
statutes were drafted hastily and provided no guidance as to whether
loss of society was recoverable Under the general maritime law.52 The
Fifth Circuit agreed that DOHSA and the Jones Act did not provide
analogical support on the issue, and further noted, in dicta, that the
preclusive effect of DOHSA did not extend beyond the statute's ambit
and that a Jones Act death claim, when joined with a general maritime
.law claim, did not preclude recovery for loss of society. 3

49. Id. at 285. In Higginbotham, the Court held that the damages recoverable in
wrongful death actions arising on the high seas are limited to those prescribed in
DOHSA. 436 U.S. at 623-24. See note 7, supra.
50. 638 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
51. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
52. 446 U.S. at 283-84. In making this observation, the Court noted that the Jones
Act did not expressly limit recovery to pecuniary losses but it had been judicially
interpreted as doing so. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court, however, apparently considers
the question of whether the Jones Act bars recovery of nonpecuniary damages open.
While discussing this question, the Court stated "assuming that the statute bars
damages for loss of society, it does so solely by virtue of judicial interpretation of
. . . [FELA] which was incorporated into the Jones Act." Id.
53. 638 F.2d at 725. See also Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71 (5th
Cir. 1980) (Gaudet-type damages recoverable in wrongful death action based on general
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In light of the foregoing considerations, the Fifth Circuit held that
Cruz's wife was entitled to recover for the loss of her husband's
society. Citing Gaudet, the court concluded that there was "no more
reason to distinguish between the types of workers whose rights
[stemmed] from that same integral jurisprudence.", The Cruz court
also found no reason to distinguish between injuries occurring on the
high seas and injuries occurring in state waters, stating that Alvez
on its facts drew no line at the marine league. Thus, the court concluded that the general maritime law afforded the spouses of seamen
or nonseamen entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness recovery for
loss of society resulting from the injury of their spouses on the high
seas or in the state waters. 5
The court warned, however, that the result in Cruz would have
been different if Mrs. Cruz's claim had been based solely on the Jones
Act. Citing Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc.,5" the court stated that
loss of society was not compensable in claims for negligence based
solely on the Jones Act. 7 However, according to the Cruz court, a
Jones Act claim, when coupled with a general maritime law claim,
would not preclude recovery for loss of society. Thus, Mrs. Cruz was
allowed to recover for the loss of her husband's society as her claim
was based on both the general maritime law and the Jones Act.
In light of the husband's previous recovery, the Cruz court, following the Gaudet guidelines," allowed only the wife's claim for loss of
society, which was defined generally as "love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, comfort and solace." The court, by
limiting the damages to these elements, reasoned that there would
be no double recovery against a defendant.
Alvez and Cruz apparently have settled in the Fifth Circuit the
issue of when loss of society damages are recoverable in maritime
personal injury actions arising in state waters. Whenever a maritime
personal injury claim is based solely on the Jones Act, the spouse
will not be entitled to recover loss of society damages. However, when
a personal injury claim is based on both the Jones Act and the general
maritime law the spouse apparently will be entitled to recover loss
of society damages.
maritime law and Jones Act); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
For discussion of these cases, see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
54. 638 F.2d at 724.
55. Id. at 725.
56. 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
57. 638 F.2d at 725. In Bodden v. American Offshore, Inc., 681 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
1982), the Fifth Circuit, in granting a wife a separate cause of action on a DOHSA
claim based on unseaworthiness, awarded pecuniary damages only, which is consistent with the Act.
58. See upra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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In addition to traditional seamen, Alvez has been extended to cover
other persons entitled to causes of action under the maritime law.
In Bacon v. Bunting,59 the wife of a passenger injured on board a
fishing vessel brought suit against the owner of the vessel for
unseaworthiness and negligence under the general maritime law. The
court struck the unseaworthiness claim because passengers are not
entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness. Noting that the wife's claim
in Alvez was based on both unseaworthiness and negligence, the Bacon
court rejected the defendant's argument that Alvez was limited to
unseaworthiness actions and allowed the wife was entitled to recover
for the loss of her husband's society under the general maritime law
for negligence.
Bacon has created an anomaly. If a seaman is injured solely
because of negligence, his or her spouse will not be able to recover
damages for loss of society, whereas the spouse of a passenger injured solely because of negligence will be able to recover damages
for loss of society. Traditionally, seamen have been afforded more
liberal remedies than nonseamen, as reflected by the fact that seamen
are entitled to the warranty of seaworthiness while passengers are
not. However, at least in this situation, it is more advantageous to
be a nonseaman than a seaman. Alvez also has been extended to harbor workers and longshoremen, who are entitled to a negligence action
against vessel owners under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In Weiland v. Pyramid
Ventures Group," the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana, citing Alvez, awarded the wife of an injured harbor worker $15,000 for the loss of her husband's society. Alvez has
raised a number of practical problems for the counsel of both plaintiffs and defendants. When handling a settlement, the prudent defense
practitioner generally requires the release to be signed by both the
claimant and the spouse and the check to be made payable to both
parties; however, this requirement is difficult or impossible to meet
if the parties are divorced at the time of settlement but were together
at the time the cause of action accrued or if the spouses have
separated and one spouse cannot be found. If the parties are together
and are represented by the same counsel, a question arises as to
whether plaintiff's counsel has a conflict of interest in attempting, if
he is called upon to do so, to determine the amount of money to be
allocated to each party.
Other difficult questions which remain unresolved include determining when the cause of action accrues in a case where the harm
occurs before the marriage and results in injury which allegedly causes
59. 534 F. Supp. 412 (D. Md. 1982); accord Sweeney v. Car/Puter Int'l Corp., 521
F. Supp. 276 (D.S.C. 1981) (injured spouse entitled to recover for loss of society).
60. 511 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. La. 1981).
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the spouse loss of society and determining when the cause of action
ceases in a case where the injury occurs during a marriage which
subsequently is terminated by divorce. Further, the procedural aspects
of a litigated claim in which the wife does not join are uncertain. For
example, in Overstreet v. Water Vessel "Norkong,"'' an injured seaman
libeled a vessel in rem and the vessel subsequently was arrested.
Later, the owners of the vessel posted a corporate surety bond and
the vessel was released. The seaman's wife, individually and as
representative of her minor children, then moved to intervene in the
seaman's cause, claiming loss of society. Finding the release bond to
be a special bond, the court, after reviewing the pertinent authorities,
concluded that "[o]nly the plaintiff in the action which prompted the
posting of the bond [could] recover against the bond.""2 Thus, the
seaman's wife's motion to intervene was denied. The court additionally noted, however, that under Cruz, the wife was entitled to a separate
cause of action for the loss of her husband's society and Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require the joinder of
the injured seaman in the spouse's action. Accordingly, the court concluded that its denial of the wife's motion for intervention did not
preclude an action by the wife against the defendant in personam or
the vessel in rem, if jurisdiction could be obtained over either.
Alvez and Cruz also raise questions concerning retroactivity,
laches, and releases. While at least one court has given Alvez retroactive application, 3 another court, applying the three-part test of
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, held that Alvez did not apply retroactively. 5
Laches, an equitable doctrine, is not a mere matter of time like
a statute of limitation; it is principally a question of the equity or
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced. A factor to be considered
in determining whether laches bars a claim is whether the analogous
state statute of limitations has expired. If the analogous statute of
limitation has not expired, the burden is upon the defendant to show
that he was prejudiced by the plaintiffs delay in bringing the claim.
If the analogous statute of limitation has expired, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the defendant has not been prejudiced
by the delay. In Nealy v. FluorDrilling Services, Inc.,"6 the plaintiffs
husband was injured on August 18, 1975, and his claim eventually
was settled on December 26, 1978. Mrs. Nealy filed her action on
September 18, 1980, claiming loss of her husband's society. The court
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

538 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
Id. at 55.
Weiland v. Pyramid Ventures Group, 511 F. Supp. 1034, 1044-45 (M.D. La. 1981).
404 U.S. 97 (1971).
Nealy v. Fluor Drilling Servs., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 789, 792-93 (W.D. La. 1981).
524 F. Supp. 789, 794 (W.D. La. 1981).
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found that the analogous statute of limitations, the three-year limit
of the Jones Act, had expired and that the plaintiffs had not carried
their burden of showing lack of prejudice by the delay. Therefore,
the court held that laches barred the spouse's loss of society claim.
Laches apparently will apply only to actions arising before October
6, 1980, which is the effective date of 46 U.S.C. 5 763(a).6 7 This statute
provides that "a suit for recovery of damages for personal injury or
death, or both, arising out of a maritime tort, shall not be maintained
unless commenced within three years from the date the cause of action
accrued." Thus, in actions arising after October 6, 1980, survivors have
only three years to bring Alvez-type actions. The effect of releases
in the injured spouse's action on the collateral or subsequent uninjured spouse's action also was addressed in Nealy. The court noted
that the uninjured spouse's claim could not be waived without that
spouse's signature. However, if the injured spouse signed an agreement waiving the uninjured spouse's cause of action, the injured
spouse would be liable to the defendant for the full amount of any
award received by the uninjured spouse.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
While punitive damages have been available in maritime actions
since 1818,8 it was not until 1981 that the applicability of punitive
damages for death cases was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in the
case of In re Merry Shipping, Inc. 9 In Merry Shipping, the court held
that under the general maritime law, "punitive damages may be
recovered ...upon a showing of willful and wanton misconduct by
the shipowner in the creation or maintenance of unseaworthy
conditions."7 Since the cases recognizing punitive damages in maritime
personal injury and death actions are of recent origin, a review of
the history of punitive damages in maritime cases other than personal injury and death is useful.
History
More than a century and a half ago, the United States Supreme
Court indicated that exemplary damages could be properly granted
in an appropriate admiralty action. In The Amiable Nancy,7 a private,
armed American brig, the Scourge, came alongside the Amiable Nancy,

67. 46 U.S.C. S 763(a) (Supp. V 1981).
68. See text at note 73, infra.
69. 650 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1981). For a detailed discussion of Merry Shipping, see
infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 623.
71. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
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a Haitian cargo ship, and took possession of her. The lower court found
that the Scourge's marines who boarded the Amiable Nancy found
her papers to.be in perfect order but nevertheless proceeded to rob
and plunder the vessel and her crew, as well as to threaten, abuse,
and assault members of the crew.
The owner, master, supercargo, and crew of the Amiable Nancy
brought suit against the owners of the Scourge for a variety of
damages. The Supreme Court held that the conduct of the crew of
the Scourge constituted "a case of gross and wanton outrage, without
any just provocation or excuse."72 Consequently, all proximate compensatory damages proved by the plaintiffs were recoverable from
the owners of the Scourge. However, the libelant's claim for punitive
damages was denied because the owners of the Scourge were not the
perpetrators of the outrage. In so holding, the Supreme Court indicated that punitive damages would be recoverable against the actual
malfeasors:
[I]f this were a suit against the original wrong-doers, it might be
proper to go yet farther, and visit upon them in the shape of exemplary damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such
lawless misconduct. But it is to be considered, that this is a suit
against the owners of the privateer . . . . They are innocent of
the demerit of this transaction, having neither directed it, nor
countenanced it, nor participated in it in the slightest degree.
Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that they are
bound to repair all the real injuries and personal wrongs sustained
by the libellants, but they are not bound to the extent of vindictive damages.7"
Although courts continued to recognize the availability of punitive
damages in admiralty,74 punitive damages were not awarded by an
admiralty court until 1859. In that year, the United States Circuit
Court for the Northern District of California decided Gallagher v. The
Yankee,"5 in which the plaintiff libeled the captain of the The Yankee
in personam for unlawfully deporting the plaintiff to the Sandwich
Islands.78 Finding that the captain acted "in violation 'of a known duty,'
72.
73.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59.

74. In Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 1,681), Justice
Story, sitting as a Circuit Judge, commented that "[in cases of marine torts, or illegal
captures, it is far from being uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs and expences,
and to mulct the offending parties, even in exemplary damages, where the nature
of the case requires it." Id. at 957. Sixteen years later, the court in Ralston v. The
State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201 (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1836) (No. 11,540) recognized the availability
of punitive damages in collision cases. Id. at 208.
75. 30 F. Cas. 781 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859) (No. 18,124), affg 9 F. Cas. 1091 (D.C.N.D.
Cal.) (No. 5,196).
76. 30 F. Cas. at 781.
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and in wanton contempt and violation of law," the court held the captain liable for punitive damages."? As noted in The Amiable Nancy,
a vessel owner will not be held vicariously liable for the wrongful
acts of his crew. For example, in Pacific Packing & Navigation Co.
8
v. Fielding,"
the court apparently assumed that the action of the
master of the Valentia in imprisoning the plaintiff, the vessel's purser,
while the Valentia was at sea, was properly found by the jury to be
unlawful, malicious, and oppressive. However, the award of punitive
damages against the vessel owner was reversed on the ground that
"no evidence was given tending to show that the defendant corporation ever authorized the master to commit any of the acts complained
of, or ever in any manner ratified them."79 Even where the vessel
owner is the wrongdoer, the wrongful conduct must be intentional
and malicious to warrant an award of punitive damages. In The
Normannia,s° the court recognized the availability of punitive damages
for the breach of a maritime contract, but it refused to award punitive
damages since the defendant had not intentionally deceived the
libelant."
Availability in Maritime Personal Injury and Death Actions
The availability of punitive damages in maritime
personal

injury
and death cases was first recognized in United States Steel Corp. v.
Fuhrman,2 popularly known as the Cedarville Case. The defendant,
United States Steel Corporation, owned the Bradley Fleet, which plied
the Great Lakes. From its Pittsburgh headquarters, the defendant
operated a radio network by which it maintained contact with the
individual ships. During a heavy fog, one of the fleet, the steamship
Cedarville, collided with another vessel. Although she was holed and
77. Id. at 785.
78. 136 F. 577 (9th Cir. 1905).
79. Id. at 579.
80. 62 F. 469, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1894); accord Crowley v. S.S. Arcadia, 1965 A.M.C.
988 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (punitive damages not awarded for overbooking of passengers absent
malicious intent).
81. Two turn of the century cases, The William H. Bailey, 103 F. 799, 800 (D.
Conn. 1900), affid mem., 111 F. 1006 (2d Cir. 1901) and The Seven Brothers, 170 F.
126 (D.R.I. 1909), illustrate the reluctance of admiralty courts to award punitive damages.
While both of these cases involved actions in rem, the Bailey court held that punitive
damages were not available in maritime in rem actions as a matter of law, whereas
the Seven Brothers court held that punitive damages were recoverable as a matter
of law in maritime in rem actions. However, the Seven Brothers court did not award
punitive damages since the action in rem was "in effect against the owner of the vessel,
who [was] not proved to have had any share in or knowledge of the malicious acts."
170 F. at 127.
82. 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). See generally
Note, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 1 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 333 (1970).
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taking on water quickly, her master ordered her beached instead of
abandoned. Before reaching shore, the Cedarville sank and ten of her
crew perished. The district court found that all of the crew would
have survived if the vessel had been abandoned and the life salvage
offer of another vessel had been accepted.
In the district court, the survivors of the deceased crewmembers
sought and obtained a judgment of punitive damages under the Jones
Act. The punitive damage award was based on two allegations. The
first allegation was that the Bradley Fleet officials failed to countermand the master's orders to beach the Cedarville and failed to order
him to abandon ship, which probably would have saved the lives of
the ten crewmembers. The second allegation was that fleet officials
had ordered the ship to proceed full speed ahead in the fog and to
deviate from recommended courses published by the United States
Coast Guard for ship traffic in the straights of Mackinac, the location
of the collision.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the punitive
damage award, declared that the district court's findings of fact were
clearly erroneous. The appellate court found that the facts did not
support the finding that the fleet manager or any other United States
Steel official "knew the full extent of the seriousness of the situation or that the beaching attempt was 'certain failure.' "83 Additionally, the company officials had no obligation under the facts to decide
the best course of action and to countermand the master's orders.
Moreover, the record did not support a finding that United States
Steel, as a general practice, ordered its ships to proceed full ahead
in heavy fog. This was not proven to be an authorized practice or
procedure. There was insufficient proof that United States Steel
authorized the practice of deviating from Coast Guard-recommended
compass headings. Although the district court's findings of fact were
held to be clearly erroneous, its conclusion of law-"Marine law permits the recovery of punitive damages against a maritime tortfeasor"S4-was not declared incorrect. The Sixth Circuit's agreement
with this general statement of the availability of punitive damages
in Jones Act cases was implied in its annunciation of the standard under
which punitive damages could be awarded:
We think the better rule is that punitive damages are not
recoverable against the owner of a vessel for the act of the master
unless it can be shown that the owner authorized or ratified the
acts of the master either before or after the accident. Punitive
83. 407 F.2d at 1146-47.
84. In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 198 (N.D. Ohio 1967),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969).
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damages also may be recoverable if the acts complained of were
those of an unfit master and the owner was reckless in employ8 5
ing him.
Since the Jones Act expressly incorporates the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA)8 by reference, Jones Act cases are viewed by
some courts as controlling in FELA cases. Notwithstanding this fact,
the Sixth Circuit, in Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,87 held
that punitive damages were not recoverable in FELA suits, since the
United States Supreme Court consistently had limited recovery under
the FELA to compensatory damages.8 The court distinguished
Fuhrman, stating that it was an admiralty action and, therefore, not
controlling in this nonmaritime suit. Thus, in the Sixth Circuit,
punitive damages are recoverable under the Jones Act, but not under
the FELA.8 Soon after Fuhrman, the Second Circuit, in In re Marine
Sulphur Queen, 1 acknowledged that punitive damages were
recoverable under the general maritime law where the vessel owner
was shown to have been "guilty of gross negligence, or actual malice
or criminal indifference which is the equivalent of reckless and wanton misconduct." 2 Although the Marine Sulphur Queen was found to
be unseaworthy in that it was defectively designed and broke ground
overloaded, the court did not find this fact sufficient to warrant an
award of punitive damages against the vessel owner. Recently, the
availability of punitive damages in maritime personal injury and death
85. 407 F.2d at 1148 (citations omitted).
Although overruled by the Sixth Circuit, the district court in Fuhrman held that
since vessel owners today, unlike in the past, are able to communicate with their masters
via radio, they should stand "on the same footing that any corporate employer stands
in regard to its responsibility for misdeed of an employee." In re Den Norske
Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163, 181 n.7 (N.D. Ohio 1967). The majority common
law view is that "the principal may be held liable for punitive damages that are occasioned by the acts of an agent if those acts were committed in furtherance of the
interest of the principal and while the agent was acting within the scope of his employment." J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE S 5.06 (1981).
86. 45 U.S.C. SS 51-60 (1976). See lB BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note 35, SS
2-1-16 to 2-1-17; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 5, S 6-26. For a further discussion on the precedential effect of the FELA in Jones Act cases, see supra notes 5-7
and accompanying text.
87. 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally Note, Punitive Damages May be
Awarded in an Action Arising Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 1113 (1971); Note, Damages-PunitiveDamages are Recoverable in Suits Brought
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 24 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1971).
88. 449 F.2d at 1241.
89. Id. at 1243.
90. See Comment, Punitive Damages in the Admiralty, 5 MAR. LAW. 223, 233-34
(1980).
91. 460 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 105.
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actions was considered by a California court of appeal in Baptiste v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.93 The plaintiff in that case filed
a complaint, seeking damages against his employer under the general
maritime law and the Jones Act. Subsequently, the plaintiff amended
his complaint, adding a request for punitive damages. The court
granted the defendant's motion to strike the amendment requesting
punitive damages, finding, as a matter of law, that punitive damages
were not recoverable under the general maritime law or the Jones
Act. The appellate court reversed the trial court and held that punitive
damages were available under the general maritime law of unseaworthiness. In reaching this decision, the court, after reviewing Fuhrman
and maritime nonpersonal injury and death punitive damages cases,
concluded that no admiralty court had denied punitive damages as
a matter of law. 94 The court also did not find FELA precedent, particularly Kozar, as controlling or persuasive "on the question of
whether a Jones Act cause of action automatically [precluded] a
recovery of punitive damages."95 The court explained that a Jones Act
claim, when coupled with a general maritime law claim for unseaworthiness, would not preclude an award of nonpecuniary damages.
Therefore, the court overturned the trial court's order striking the
plaintiffs allegation concerning punitive damages, holding "that plaintiff [was] entitled to present the issue of punitive damages to a jury.""
Although the court did hold that Baptiste was entitled to a cause of
action for punitive damages, it did not decide the standard under which
punitive damages could be awarded. The court remanded the case
to the trial court to determine whether the defendant's acts warranted
an award of punitive damages. The latest case involving the issue
of whether punitive damages are recoverable in a seaman's personal
injury or death action is In re Merry Shipping, Inc.97 In this case,
93. 106 Cal. App. 3d 87, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
Baptiste, a seaman, sought $200 million in punitive damages against his corporate
employer, Chevron Shipping Company. He contended that the defendant knew that
the impermissibly high noise levels on the vessels on which the plaintiff worked would
cause permanent hearing loss. Rather than replacing the gears which were causing
the noise, the company adopted the "cheapest solution [which was] . . . to provide
and enforce use of earphones while in the engine room." 106 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 164
Cal. Rptr. at 791. Despite the defendant's safety measures, Mr. Baptiste suffered a
permanent hearing loss. Mr. Baptiste claimed that the defendant acted "willfully, wantonly, intentionally and with reckless disregard," in failing to remedy the dangerous
condition. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 93, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 791. (Baptiste is also reported at
1980 A.M.C. 1523.)
94. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
95. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
96. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
97. 650 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1981). The court did not elaborate upon the facts,
apparently because the case was only at the pleading stage. All that is given is that
Charles Dyer, a first mate on the defendant's tug, drowned when the tug capsized.
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Lillian Dyer sought punitive damages against the defendant, Merry
Shipping, under the general maritime law and the Jones Act for her
alleged common law husband's death resulting from the sinking of
the M/V Royal Lady. The trial court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, holding, as a matter of law, that punitive
damages were not recoverable under either the Jones Act or the
general maritime law. On appeal, after reviewing In re Marine Sulphur
Queen, Fuhrman,Baptiste, and maritime nonpersonal injury and death
cases involving punitive damages,98 the court concluded, as did the
court in Baptiste, that the cases did not hold punitive damages
"unrecoverable as a matter of law, but rather denied them on the
facts." Consequently, the court held that in the Fifth Circuit punitive
damages were recoverable, at least under the general maritime law. 9
The court then announced the standard under which punitive damages
could be awarded in cases involving an unseaworthiness claim, such
as in Merry Shipping. Seamen, according to the court, are totally
98. The court reviewed Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973)
and Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp 277 (D. Mass. 1980), which are
the only cases other than The Yankee v. Gallagher, 30 F. Cas. 781 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859)
(No. 18,124) in which courts have awarded punitive damages in maritime actions. In
Robinson, the defendant initially refused to pay the plaintiff seaman maintenance and
cure and later paid only at irregular intervals. Finding that the Supreme Court's award
of attorney's fees in Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) was punitive, the First
Circuit held that the defendant's wrongful withholding of maintenance and cure warranted an award of punitive damages. 477 F.2d at 1049-52. Contra Kraljic v. Berman
Enters., Inc., 575 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978) (the Second Circuit agreed with the First
Circuit's conclusion in Robinson that the award of attorney's fees in Vaughan was
punitive in nature, but the Second Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court, in
Vaughan, only intended for.attorney's fees, not punitive damages, to be awarded in
such cases). In Pino v. ProtectionMaritime Ins. Co., the district court initially adjudicated
the parties' liability, 454 F. Supp. 210 (D. Mass. 1978), affd in part and remanded in
part, 599 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1979), and it then assessed
the plaintiff's damages, 490 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1980). At the liability hearing, the
court held that
three of the defendants, Ernest A. Enos ... Protection Maritime Insurance Company, Limited ... , and Trans-Atlantic Marine Insurance Company .... had tortiously interfered with the employment rights of eight of the plaintiffs by purposely and without privilege demanding higher insurance premiums from the
owners of the fishing vessels on which plaintiffs worked.
490 F. Supp. at 278. Later, at the hearing on damages, the court found that the defendant "acted in wanton and intentional disregard of the plaintiffs' employment rights,
making this case an especially appropriate one for an award of punitive damages."
490 F. Supp. at 281. But cf. Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Servs., 653 F.2d 1057, 1064
(5th Cir. 1981) ("[iun striking the balance between the employer's right to have a free
hand in the running of his business and the seaman's interest in the unencumbered
exercise of his legal rights, we conclude that, while the balance weighs in the seaman's
favor on the question of the recognition of the claim for retaliatory discharge, the scales
tilt against the imposition of punitive damages").
99. 650 F.2d at 626.
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dependent upon the shipowner to provide them with a seaworthy
vessel on which to work. Thus, to insure that seamen are not exposed
to the perils of unseaworthy vessels, the court held that "[p]unitive
damages should be available when a shipowner has willfully violated
the duty to furnish and maintain a seaworthy vessel." 100
The court did not decide the question of whether punitive damages
are recoverable in actions based solely on the Jones Act. The court,
however, did note that the district court might have been correct in
its conclusion that punitive damages were not recoverable under the
Jones Act, since the Fifth Circuit previously had held that Congress
only intended for pecuniary losses to be recoverable under the Jones
Act. The court also noted that FELA precedent, especially Kozar,
might be dispositive of the issue of recoverability of punitive damages
under the Jones Act.
Although the court indicated that punitive damages were not
recoverable in claims based solely on the Jones Act, the court,
analogizing punitive damages to other nonpecuniary damages
recoverable in maritime actions, concluded that a Jones Act claim,
when coupled with a general maritime law claim, did not preclude
recovery of punitive damages. Therefore, the trial court's ruling was
reversed and the case was remanded to determine whether the facts
warranted an award of punitive damages."' The Fifth Circuit, in Merry
Shipping, analogized punitive damages to loss of society damages. Such
an analogy furnishes a basis for allowing punitive damages awards
to be governed by Cruz, Alvez, Gaudet, Higginbotham, and Hlodan.
Thus, under Higginbotham, punitive damages may not be recoverable
in wrongful death actions arising on the high seas. Likewise, under
Ivy, punitive damages should not be recoverable in wrongful death
actions based solely on the Jones Act. However, under Hlodan,
punitive damages should be recoverable in wrongful death actions
based upon both the Jones Act and the general maritime law for
unseaworthiness. Under Gaudet, punitive damages may be recoverable
in wrongful death actions arising in state waters and based upon the
general maritime law. Finally, under Alvez and Cruz, punitive damages
may be recoverable in maritime personal injury cases arising on both
the high seas and in state waters, except when the action is based
solely on the Jones Act.'
100. Id. at 625.
101. Id. at 626-27.
102. Kreger v. Midstream Transfer, No. 81-960 (E.D. La. March 24, 1982) should
be of interest to the insurance practitioner. In Kreger, Judge Mitchell held that protection and indemnity insurance covers punitive damages. The judge apparently was
applying state law, rather than the general maritime law. This decision has been
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. No. 82-3233 (5th Cir. argued Feb. 3, 1983).
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INFLATION AND FUTURE DAMAGES

Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled upon
whether future inflation can be considered in determining lost future
earnings, the Court has decided the manner in which trial courts are
to calculate future damages. In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v.
Kelly," an FELA case, the Court held that the sum representing the
total future earnings of a plaintiff must be discounted to present value,
that is, the amount which, if safely invested, would grow to an amount
equal to the lost future earnings. The Court reasoned that a "sum
of money in hand is worth more than the like sum .. .payable in
the future."'' 4 Although the Court did not detail the discounting process, it did explain that the discount rate should be the interest rate
obtainable by an unsophisticated person through safe investment,
existing and available at the time and place of the trial."'O Until the
1970's, most federal courts of appeals reasoned that inflation was too
speculative to consider in determining future earnings awards.'
However, with the continuing presence of inflation in the 1970's, most
courts overruled their older decisions, and they now incorporate inflation in some manner. Among the courts which incorporate inflation in their awards, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits favor
an approach whereby the future earnings are discounted at a rate
lower than present interest rates, because the present interest rates
take future inflation into account."' The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits favor a method whereby inflation is considered in determining future earnings and then the award is discounted at present interest rates."0

103. 241 U.S. 485 (1916). See generally Note, Future Inflation and Damage Awards,
35 LA. L. REV. 883 (1975).
104. 241 U.S. at 489.
105. Id. at 489-91. In Kelly, a state trial court, hearing Kelly's FELA action against
his employer, refused to discount the future earnings award to present value, holding
that discounting the future award to present value would be too difficult for a jury
to determine. After this holding was affirmed by a Kentucky court of appeal, the
Supreme Court overruled the lower court and set out the procedure by which lower
courts are to discount future earnings to present value. Id.
106. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1975); Frankel
v. Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972), affig 321 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Yodice
v. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Stoom. Maat., 471 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972); Sleeman v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 414 F.2d 305, 307-08 (6th Cir. 1969); Furumizo v. United
States, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967), affig 245 F.Supp. 981 (D. Hawaii 1965). But cf.
Burlington Transp. Co. v. Stoltz, 191 F.2d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1951) (Utah law).
107. See infra notes 114-125 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
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The Traditional Approach
Under the traditional approach, trial courts first determined the
future earnings ' that the plaintiff would have received during the
remainder of his or her work-life expectancy. The courts then discounted these future earnings to present value by a conservative, riskfree, long-term interest rate." ° For example, if a plaintiff going to trial
in 1982 would have earned $10,000 in 1992, the amount awarded to
the plaintiff would be the amount which, if safely invested in 1982,
would grow to $10,000 in 1992. Assuming that the interest rate on
safe investments in 1982 is ten percent, the wage to be earned in
1992, $10,000, is discounted by ten percent, yielding $3,800, the present value of the 1992 earnings.
The critics of the traditional method argued that giving the plaintiff the present value of $10,000 in 1982 to compensate for lost earnings of $10,000 in 1992 undercompensated the plaintiff because the
purchasing power of $10,000 in 1992, assuming continued inflation,
would be less than the purchasing power of $10,000 in 1982.2" Another
criticism of the traditional approach was that defendants were allowed
to take advantage of inflation while plaintiffs were not. Interest rates
contain a component designed to compensate the lender for the
decreased purchasing power of- the money loaned. By this adjustment,
the lender recaptures the original purchasing power of the loan and
makes a profit, which is the real rate of return. Thus, by discounting
at current interest rates, it was contended that defendants were
allowed to take advantage of inflation in the discounting process. Plaintiffs, however, were not allowed to take advantage of inflation in
calculating future damages. The main argument in favor of the traditional approach is that consideration of future inflation is too
speculative. The Fifth Circuit, while defending the traditional approach
in Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co.," 2 stated that it "cannot so surely
discern the shadow of inflation as a coming event as to warrant requiring its inclusion in a present rule for calculating future damages."
Another argument is that the full interest rate, including the inflation component, is available to the plaintiff, whereas the question of
109. *The effect of future inflation is not considered in determining future earnings. Future earnings are based upon what a person with the experience the plaintiff
would have had in the future would be making at the present time.
110. Johnson v. Penrod Drilling Co., 510 F.2d 234, 237-41 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally
Note, supra note 103, at 885; Note, Damages-FutureInflation-Factof Possible Future
Inflation Will Not Be Included in the Calculation of Future Damages, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J.
432 (1975).
111. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 1982); O'Shea
v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1982); Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1980).
112. 510 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975).
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whether his annual wages will increase with inflation is too speculative
to determine. A collateral argument has been made that risk factors
in the plaintiff's future earning stream might offset, in whole or in
part, inflationary wage increases. A projection of future earnings based
on the assumption of a constant annual rate of inflation might cause
overcompensation, because a worker's annual earnings often, over a
period of years, do not increase parallel to the inflationary increase
in the worker's hourly wage. Annual incomes are often cyclical as
they reflect the uncertainty or risk in the worker's earnings stream."
For this reason, when projecting future wages, probable increases in
income, whether due to inflation or otherwise, should be reduced for
likely risk before discounting to present value or the rate of discount
should be increased for such risk. Variability should be considered
in any earnings projection, notwithstanding the consideration of a constant rate of wage inflation.
Discount Rate at Less Than Current Interest Rate
Real Rate of Discount Method
Recognizing the apparent injustice in including inflation in the discount rate but not in calculating future earnings, the Second"' and
Seventh1 5 Circuits have favored a method whereby future earnings
are not increased for likely inflation but are discounted at the real
rate of interest, that is, the component of the interest rate designed
to provide the lender with a profit. Since the future inflation rate
and the current interest rate minus the real interest rate are presumed
to be equal, the plaintiff theoretically is compensated adequately under
this approach.
For example, under this theory, if a plaintiff going to trial in 1982
would have earned $10,000 in 1992, this amount would be discounted
by the real rate of interest,"' and the plaintiff would invest the award
at current interest rates. The Second Circuit favors this approach
because it precludes speculation as to the future rate of inflation and
promotes judicial economy, since the impact of inflation on future earnings is not proven at trial."7
113. Compare the plaintiffs past annual earnings tax returns with his past hourly
wage increases. If the plaintiffs annual earnings were variable, the margin between
his increased hourly earnings capacity (wage increase) and his actual earnings represents
the risk or uncertainty of the income.
114. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1982).
116. The historical real rate of interest has been estimated to be between one percent and three percent.
117. Doca v. Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 634 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Second Circuit indicated that the trial should not turn into a graduate seminar
on economic forecasting.
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The major criticism of this approach is that in calculating future
earnings, it is difficult to segregate increases due to cost of living
from increases due to productivity and merit. If cost of living increases
are not removed from future earnings, inflation will be considered
twice and the defendant will be prejudiced, since discounting at the
Further, the plaintiff
real rate of interest accounts for inflation.118
still must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his annual
future loss of income would have increased in accordance with the
yearly anticipated rates of inflation. If the plaintiff cannot meet this
burden, the discount rate used must be increased appropriately." 9
The Total Offset Method
Recently, the Third Circuit, in Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,' 20 adopted the "total offset" method, commonly known as the
Alaska rule. Under this theory, inflation is not considered in calculating
future earnings, but the sum representing future earnings is not discounted, because the current interest rate and the future inflation
rate are presumed to be equal.'"' The Third Circuit mandated the total
offset method because it avoids "the danger of speculating as to the
future of inflation."' 2 The court also noted that this method promotes
judicial economy'23 and makes ultimate awards of future damages more
inflation and future interest rates
predictable, because the variables of
24
are deleted from the calculation.
One problem with the total offset method is that it erroneously
assumes that lenders do not make a profit from their loans. As noted
118. Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), reh'g
applied for, No. 79-3985.
119. Id. at 305-06, reh'g appliedfor, No. 79-3985. In Culver, this principle is recognized
by the Fifth Circuit. The principle also must not be overlooked when a court adopts
the "total offset method," as the plaintiff still must be required to sustain his burden
of proof, regardless of any assumptions made about discount rates, inflation rates,
or their interrelationship.
120. 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
121. 678 F.2d at 461. The court stated: "The total offset method avoids the danger
of speculating as to the future rate of inflation by making ... a very sensible accommodation: it assumes that in the long run the effects of future inflation and the discount rate will co-vary significantly with the other." Id.
122. Id.
123. Quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa.
561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), the Fifth Circuit noted that "[a]n additional virtue of the
total offset method is its contribution to judicial efficiency. Litigators are freed from
introducing and verifying complex economic data. Judges and juries are not burdened
with complicated, time consuming economic testimony." 678 F.2d at 461.
124. Again quoting Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), the
court noted that by "eliminating the variables of inflation and future interest rates
from the damage calculation, the ultimate award is more predictable." 678 F.2d at 461.
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earlier, interest rates include a component to recover the lost purchasing power of the loan, as well as a component for profit, that
is, the real rate of interest. A second problem is that the Pfeifer court
arguably is incorrect in its view that this method eliminates speculation about inflation and discount rates. Even where a court assumes
that the annual rate of inflation and discount are equal, before such
a method may be employed, the plaintiff, in each case, should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his future
annual earnings will likely increase consistently with the future annual
rate of inflation.2 5 In other words, if the only evidence presented is
one year's earnings or if past tax returns show no annual increases
in earnings consistent with past annual inflation, some competent
evidence should be required before the total offset method is applied
to future income losses. If, in any case, the individual does not establish
the likelihood of such increases, a net discount factor must be applied
to the extent there is a shortfall.
The Effect of Future Inflation on Future Earnings-The Evidentiary
Approaches
Under these methods, courts consider inflation (either directly or
indirectly) while determining future earnings and then discount future
earnings by the current interest rate. In Culver v. Slater Boat Co.,12'
the Fifth Circuit favored a method whereby the trial court considers
the plaintiffs own salary in the years prior to the incapacitating event
or, in the alternative, considers all the likely increases in wages
nationally or in the plaintiff's occupational and geographic area. The
increases in income which are considered include increases in cost of
living, as well as increases due to merit and productivity. Thus, inflation is considered indirectly in determining future earnings through
the consideration of cost of living increases.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, like the Fifth Circuit, prefer
evidence of an increase in wages, rather than evidence of inflation
generally. Recognizing that the "predictive abilities of economists have
not advanced so far that they can forecast with any certainty the
existence of a rate of inflation for the next thirty years" the Sixth
Circuit has allowed the "use of economists and other experts . . .in
some cases to show that raises in income ...would most probably

125. See Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d 280, 297 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), reh'g
applied for, No. 79-3985. In Pfeiffer, it appears from the record that no adequate past
earnings history was evidenced. The plaintiff arguably laid no foundation for the application of a total offset rule, i.e., for assuming that the plaintiff's future annual losses
of income would increase fully and constantly at the rate of inflation.
126. 688 F.2d 280, 308-10 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), reh'g applied for, No. 79-3985.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 43

occur." 12 Similarly, in the Eighth Circuit, consideration of "future wage
increases" is permissible."' 8
Although the Ninth Circuit apparently will allow consideration of
the impact of inflation generally, rather than just the impact of inflation on wages, it still restricts the introduction of evidence on inflation. In United States v. English,2 ' the Ninth Circuit held that the
jury "in awarding damages [is] to take into account such estimates
of future changes in the purchasing power of money as are based on
sound and substantial economic evidence, and as can be postulated
with some reliability."
The criticisms of the evidentiary approaches are that they do not
promote judicial economy and they produce unpredictability in damage
awards. Allowing testimony as to future interest rates will result in
lengthy adversary proceedings to determine the proper future effect
of inflation. Also, since the ability of parties to prove future 'rates
of inflation and their effect on each plaintiff will differ, there inevitably
will be varying damage awards for similar casualties. In Culver, the
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the argument that an evidentiary
approach frustrates judicial economy, arguing that an evidentiary
approach is simpler and more accurate; for instance, discounting by
the real rate of interest, which requires the "more difficult task of
breaking down the data into the reasons for the increase, e.g., cost
of living or merit increases, is not necessary."13' The Fifth Circuit also
.expressly disapproved of the total offset method, because although
it might be more expedient, the total offset method favors plaintiffs
over defendants."' On October 5, 1982, the Supreme Court of the
127. Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978). The
court stated:
Yet testimony on the exact income that the decedent would have received
through the year 2002 is so speculative, in our view, that it is inadmissible.
We do not hold, however, that the jury may never consider inflation and future
increases in income in determining damages. Ideally, the damage award should
compensate appellant for the financial loss she will suffer as a result of the death
of her husband. If a jury is not permitted to consider decreases in the purchasing
power of money, appellant would be woefully damaged if inflation should continue at its present or at any other substantial rate. Some consideration of probabilities is inevitable in any fair award of damages.
Id. at 632.
128. Taenzler v. Burlington Northern, 608 F.2d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 1979).
129. 521 F.2d 63, 75-76 (9th Cir. 1975); accord Sauers v. Alaska Barge & Transp.,
Inc., 600 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1980) (maritime case).
130. 688 F.2d at 298.
131. Id. at 298. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Culver, the plaintiff should have
the opportunity to prove likely noninflationary wage increases. On the other hand,
the defendant will want to show that the plaintiff's annual income did not increase
at a rate parallel to the rate of inflation, and to that extent, an appropriate discount
to present value is necessary or the plaintiff will be overcompensated. Id. at 292.
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United States granted certiorari in Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.;'32 thus the Court may consider the inflation and discount issues.
In light of the varying results. produced by the total offset method,
the real rate of interest method, and the evidentiary approaches,'33
it is hoped that the Supreme Court will adopt one approach so that
inflation will be treated uniformly in all actions governed by federal
law.
THE EFFECT OF FUTURE INCOME TAXATION ON DAMAGES

Traditionally, courts did not consider the fact that future earnings awards were not subject to taxation, because the prediction of
tax consequences was considered too speculative and complex for a
jury's deliberation. Recently, however, the Urnited States Supreme
Court, in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, 34 an FELA case,
rejected this rationale and held that future income tax consequences
should be considered in determining future earnings. An issue corollary to the one presented in Liepelt is whether future taxes on income earned by investing the damage award can be considered in
determining the damage award. The Ninth Circuit recently addressed
this issue in DeLucca v. United States'3 5 and held that the district court
properly added to the damage award an amount which would sufficiently compensate for taxes on the income that would be earned by
investing the award.
132. 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 50 (1982).
133. The total offset method and the discount-at-the-real-rate-of-interest method produce varying results, because under the real rate method, future earnings are at least
discounted by the real rate of interest. Similarly, the total offset method and the evidentiary approaches produce varying results, because the percent increases in plaintiffs
income due to cost of living and the interest component built into interest rates will
not always be equal.
134. 444 U.S. 490 (1980). See generally Crick, Taxes, Lost Future Earningsand Unexamined Assumptions, 34 NATL TAX J. 271 (1981); Comment, Income Tax Effects On Personal Injury Recoveries, 30 LA. L. REV. 672, 679 (1970); Comment, Income Taxation and
the Calculationof Tort Damage Awards: The Ramifications of Norfolk & Western Railway
v. Liepelt, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1981); Note, Jury Review of Tax Consequences
of FELA Damage Awards Now Considered Remote, 26 Loy. L. REv. 409 (1980).
135. 670 F.2d 843, 84445 (9th Cir. 1982).

